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Abstract
This study examines how the eects of a regionalisation of unemployment
insurance (UI) depend on the size of unions relative to the labour force. For
this purpose, we compare the outcome of two models with central and with
regional UI, respectively. These models combine elements from bargaining
theory and migration theory with self-nancing UI. Our results demonstrate
the importance of the bargaining structure in the debate on regionalising UI.
Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether eciency
favours regional or central UI.
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The risk of a specic worker to become unemployed depends among other things on
the branch of industry, age, education, and on the region, where he or she supplies
labour. These characteristics can in principle be observed by the unemployment
insurance (UI) authority. Nonetheless, it is customary, to levy obligatory UI taxes
or to pay UI benets regardless of the specic risk a worker bears. This implies that
workers with a relatively low risk of becoming unemployed (involuntarily) subsidise
workers with a systematically high risk. Such a subsidy leads to a distorsion of
workers` decisions, e.g. where to supply labour. This paper investigates the eects
of regionalising UI under the assumptions that UI is self-nancing, and that UI taxes
(not benets) are adjusted to equilibrate the budget. Such a measure would bring
about UI taxes that re
ect perfectly the risk of unemployment within each region.
Intuition suggests that this would enhance welfare, and that agents from the rich
region prot to the disadvantage of agents from the poor region.
Labour markets do not clear because the wage rate, bargained between trade
unions and employers, is binding. Unions maximise the expected utility of a repre-
sentative worker. This expected utility is aected, inter alia, by UI taxes employed
workers have to pay, and by UI benets unemployed workers receive. If contribu-
tions are adjusted to balance the UIs budget, they are dependent on the rate of
unemployment, and thus on the bargained wages. The extent to which unions take
into account the interplay between wages and contributions crucially depends on
the size of a union relative to the total workforce. It is rational for a union to ne-
glect the externality its policy implies for other unions. This statement would be
valid even if each union could be better o, if all unions would take this eect into
account. The larger a union is, the more of the negative impact of a higher wage
on employment is internal and is thus taken into account. For myopic unions, the
eect of the bargained wage on the UI tax rate is negligible. Yet, since every union
neglects it, the total size of this externality is considerable. If there is only one single
union, the negative impact would be entirely internal. It is interesting to analyse
how the size of a union aects the assessment of a regionalisation of UI because the
way UI is organised has an eect on how elastic UI contributions react on variations
of unemployment.
1The role of the bargaining structure on wages is analysed in a well-known paper
by Calmfors and Drill (1988). In that study, the so-called "hump-shape hypoth-
esis" is put forward. According to Calmfors and Drill, centralisation of the wage
bargain has two contrary eects on net wages. On the one hand, more of an increase
of nominal wages can be shifted by raising output prices if the bargain is more cen-
tral. This causes rms to accept higher wages. On the other hand, the aggregated
price level rises more if the bargain is relatively central, which reduces real prots
(Calmfors and Drill, 1988, p. 39). Even though we do not consider the impact
of the bargaining structure on prices, it may be worth comparing our results with
those derived in that study.
Another important aspect is the role of migration. Economists advocating the
regionalisation of UI sometimes point to the allocative advantages it is supposed to
have (Welfens, 1998, p. 293). A possible line of reasoning is that workers migrate
to regions which are less concerned by unemployment and thus characterised by
lower UI contributions. Regionalisation thereby serves as a substitute for higher
dierences of wages which do not re
ect the relative regional scarcity of labour.
However, this point of view is rather supercial. As long as unemployment persists
in every region, there is no direct eciency gain from reallocating workers from
one region to another. But migration aects the UI tax rate, depending on the
conditions of eligibility. If wages react on variations of the UI tax rate, eciency
may be aected indirectly. It is not quite clear, however, if it is improved or worsened
by the regionalisation of UI.
Since the eects of regionalising UI are subject to a complex interplay of wages,
UI taxes, and migration, a formal model is an adequate mean to simplify the matter.
In the following section, an analytical framework is established to analyse the eects
of a regionalisation of UI for dierent degrees of centralisation of the bargain. Due
to the complexity of the models, a comparison can only be executed numerically
which is subject of section 3. Our results conrm the importance of the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining for the assessment of the regionalisation of UI by
workers and employers, and for the eciency of the measure. Section 4 contains
some concluding remarks.
22 Formal analysis
We employ the following simplifying assumptions and standardisations:
A1 A federal state consists of two regions (i 2 1;2) which dier only with respect
to the endowment with an immobile, inelastically and costlessly supplied fac-
tor of production subsequently referred to as infrastructure, xi. Region 1 is
assumed to possess more infrastructure than region 2, x1 > x2, without loss
of generality. Region 1 is referred to as the rich region, whereas region 2 is
named poor.
A2 In each region, K identical rms produce a single homogeneous good which is
taken as numeraire. K is assumed to be suciently large that rms behave
as price-takers on every market. The technology of a representative rm shall





where n symbolises labour input. Denoting derivatives with subscripts, it
is assumed that fni > 0, fxi > 0, fnini < 0. Infrastructure enhances the
productivity of labour, expressed by a positive cross-derivative, fnixi > 0.







where w represents the gross wage rate per unit labour. Prot maximisation
yields the inverse labour demand function:
fni = w: (2)
A3 M identical workers inelastically supply one unit of labour. They share the




where c stands for consumption of the homogenous good, and where the su-
perscript j with j 2 e;u, indicates whether a worker is employed (j = e) or
3not (j = u). Consumption before the deduction of eventual migration costs
reads ci;e = (1 i)wi in the case of employment, where  is the proportional
UI tax rate, and ci;u = iwi, with w denoting the wage level used to calculate
UI benets, and  standing for the benet rate, in the case of unemployment.
Workers maximise expected utility by choosing the region where they supply
labour.
A4 Ex ante, there live half of the workers in each region. Migration occurs only in
one direction, namely, from the poor to the rich region. If a worker migrates,
costs corresponding with an annuity of k arise. In both regions, workers are
distributed equally over rms, sharing the same employment opportunities
(Creedy and McDonald, 1991, p. 348). The number of workers per rm is
denoted by m.
A5 All (employed and unemployed) workers are members of a trade union. The
gross wage rate is subject to a bargain between a union and pK rms, where
the exogenous variable p 2 (0;1] is the degree of centralisation of the bargain,
or, put dierently, the size of a union. If p ! 0, the share of workers repre-
sented by a specic union is negligable (atomistic structure or decentralised
bargain). If p = 1, one single union represents all workers of a region. It is as-
sumed, that the degree of centralisation is equal in both regions. Firms retain
control over employment (right-to-manage approach, see Nickell and Andrews
(1983), and, for adaptions of the model with UI, e.g. Pissarides (1998), and
Holmlund (1998)).
A6 Unions maximise the expected utility of a representative member (see e.g.
Oswald, 1985, p. 163), acknowledging the budget constraint of UI, as well as
employment and wages elsewhere in the federal state, while e.g. migration is
neglected. We employ the symmetric Nash solution to the bargaining problem
which maximises the product of a unions and the corresponding rms payo.
Firms attain zero prots if the bargain breaks down, so that the payo of an
agreement equals the value of the prots (Creedy and McDonald, 1991, p. 350).
The `threat point' of a union is given by the situation when all of its members
receive UI benets. The payo of a union, G, is thus the dierence between
4the expected utility of a representative worker in the case of an agreement,














fu[(1   )w]   u[w]g: (3)
A7 The UI is obliged to balance its budget. Alternatively, it is assumed that the
budget(s) is (are) to be balanced within each region (regional UI), or on the
whole (central or federal UI).
The cases of regionally, and centrally equilibrated UI budgets are considered sepa-
rately within the following two subsections.
2.1 Central UI
UI budget constraint
Since all rms as well as all unions are identical, the outcome of the bargain is
uniform within each region ex post. Then, the wage level used to calculate UI
benets equals the wage rate within each region, wi = wi. Ex post, the UI budget












The left-hand side of equation (4) collects the revenues, and the right-hand side
stands for the expenditures of the UI, for the two regions respectively.
The reaction of UI taxes on variations of wages and / or employment is trans-
parent to the unions, i.e. they are aware of the UIs budget constraint. But, in
contrast to the UI authority, unions have an in
uence on wages and employment of
some part of the workforce. Consequently, each union dierentiates between pKm
workers represented by itself, and (1   p)Km workers represented by other unions.
Ex ante, unions regard the wage rate for the represented workers as being subject
of the bargain, while the wage rate elsewhere is taken as exogenous. In analogy,
employment within corresponding rms is viewed as being dependent on the wage
5rate to be negotiated, while employment elsewhere in the region and in the other
region are taken as given by each union. The UI budget constraint from the point


















where n and w carry a bar if they are exogenous from the point of view of the re-
spective union. The rst term on either side of equation (5) symbolises the revenues
and expenditures related to workers from region 1, which are not member of the
considered union. The second term stands for the respective values related to the
members of the union. The third term represents UI revenues and expenditures
within region 2. A parallel consideration yields the UI budget constraint from the


















Equations (5) and (6) are equivalent to (4) ex post, i.e. if w1 = w1, w2 = w2,
n1 = n1 and n2 = n2.
The bargaining problem
If the wage is determined by the Nash solution to the bargaining problem, the




































The product of the payos of a union and of the corresponding pK rms, dened in
equations (1) and (3), is maximised subject to two constraints. The rst constraint
is the labour demand curve to be met, given by equation (2). This must be the case
because rms are free to choose the prot maximising amount of labour (right-to-
manage approach). The second constraint is that of UI being self-nancing. The
6union recognises thus, that a higher wage leads to a smaller number of employed
workers (rst constraint), and that this smaller number of workers increases the UI
tax rate to be payed by its members (second constraint). A parallel consideration





































Starting point is a situation where workers are distributed equally across regions.
Workers from the poor region emigrate to the rich region, enhancing thereby ex-
pected utility. Expected utility in turn depends on the probability of being em-
ployed, i.e. on the number of workers applying for a given number of jobs. The
more workers immigrate in region 1, the smaller is the chance of becoming em-
ployed there on the one hand. On the other hand, emigration raises the probability
of employment in region 2. Migration thereby aligns the expected utilities of workers
from region 2 in the cases of emigration and of remaining. In equilibrium, workers
from region 2 are indierent between emigrating and resting in their home region.





















The left-hand side of equation (9) represents the expected utility of a worker from
the poor region in the case of emigration to the rich region. The right-hand side
of the equation stands for the expected utility of a worker from the poor region in
the case of resting there. The model is closed by the condition that the number
of workers within the federal state is given, i.e. each immigrant in region 1 is an
emigrant from region 2:
(m
1 + m
2)K = M: (10)
Equations (9) and (10) jointly determine the number of workers per rm within each
region, m1 and m2, for given wages, wi, for given employment, ni, and for a given
UI tax rate, . The equilibrium values of these variables result from the rst-order
7conditions of the maximisation problems (7) and (8) together with the information
that the bargain solutions within each region are identical.
2.2 Regional UI
UI budget constraints
With regional UI, the revenues of UI correspond with the respective expenditures
















If a union from region 1 dierentiates between members and workers who are rep-




























Ex post, equations (11) and (13), as well as equations (12) and (14) are equivalent.
The bargaining problem
The Nash product to be maximised consists of the expected utility function of a
representative member of a union, and the prot function multiplied by the number
of rms per union. The maximisation is subject to two constraints. First, a point
on the (inverse) labour demand function (2) must be realised. Second, the resulting
combination of wage rate and employment must be compatible with an equilibrated

































































The rst-order conditions of these Lagrangians yield the equilibrium values of ni;wi
and i, while the distribution of workers on regions is determined as follows.
Migration
With regionally independent UI budgets, the only economic interaction between the
two regions is migration. The condition for an equilibrium with respect to migra-
tion decisions of workers from the poor region remains nearly unchanged. Merely
regarding the superscripts of  some dierences emerge:
n1





u[w1   k] (17)
=
n2







The interpretation of this equilibrium condition is analogous to equation (9). Again,
the model is closed by a condition stating that each immigrant in region 1 is at the
same time emigrant from region 2:
(m
1 + m
2)K = M: (18)
Equations (17) and (18) simultaneously determine the number of workers attached
to rms in region 1 and region 2.
The model determines the equilibrium values of ni, wi, i and mi. The equations
necessary to solve for these variables are the rst-order conditions of the maximisa-
tion problems (15) and (16), as well as equations (17) and (18). As a by-product,
the Lagrange multiplier i and i can be calculated. They show how the respective
value of the Nash product reacts if the marginal productivity of labour rises (i)
or if the UI is marginally subsidised (i). The complexity of the equations exhibits
that the solutions can be derived numerically only, which is subject of the following
section.
93 A numerical specication
There are two requirements the functions and parameter values used to calibrate
a model have to full. On the one hand, they should be in a plausible range for
the results and predictions of the model to have a weight. On the other hand,
they should be as simple as possible. Here, the specications are mainly due to
the second aim. Nevertheless, most of the results can be expected to hold if more
realistic functions and parameter values are assumed.
The chosen utility function and production function read:
utility function u(c) =
p
c,







where a is a positive parameter. Both functions have the assumed properties, i.e.
positive rst derivatives, and negative second derivatives with respect to consump-
tion and employment, respectively1. The cross-derivative of the production function
is positive, so that infrastructure has a positive eect on the productivity of labour.
The labour demand function can be obtained by partially dierentiating f(), and
rearranging: n = x   aw. The values for the exogenous parameters are given in
table 1.
parameter a  k K M x1 x2
value 0:6 0:57 0:27 1 1 1 0:6
Table 1: parameter values
Central UI
With the assumed functions and parameters it is possible to calculate the values
of the endogenous variables for dierent degrees of centralisation of the bargain.
Table 2 gives the results for wages, number of workers and employment per rm
in both regions, as well as the UI tax rate necessary for an equilibrated bud-
get. The calibration is performed for a degree of centralisation of the bargain of
p = 0:00;0:05;0:10;0:15 and 0:20. The case p ! 0 corresponds with decentralised
10bargaining, which is standard in bargaining theory. If p > 0:20, no inner solution
can be found for the assumed functions and parameter values.
p 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
n1 0.578 0.585 0.591 0.597 0.602
m1 0.612 0.609 0.607 0.606 0.604
w1 0.703 0.692 0.682 0.672 0.664
n2 0.347 0.350 0.352 0.354 0.356
m2 0.388 0.391 0.393 0.394 0.396
w2 0.422 0.417 0.414 0.410 0.407
 0.042 0.035 0.029 0.024 0.019
Table 2: numerical results, central UI
Table 2 shows that a higher degree of centralisation of the bargain leads to
lower wages in both regions. This implies higher employment and, thereby, lower
UI contributions. Equilibrium migration from the poor to the rich region is slightly
lower when unions are larger. This result is due to the fact that wage dierences
are higher in the rich region. A union has more members in region 1 because there
are more workers in region 1, while the number of unions is equal. Therefore, the
concession a union from region 1 makes with respect to the wage rate has more
in
uence on the UI tax rate than a reduction of the wage rate in region 2. This
causes wages to react more elastically on variations of p than in region 2. The
employment eect which works in the opposite direction with respect to migration,
does not compensate the former eect. In the case of a monopoly union, the positive
eect of a higher wage rate exactly corresponds with the negative eect of lower
employment at the margin. With wage bargaining, the wage rate must be lower,
so that the positive eect of a higher wage rate overcompensates the negative eect
of a lower employment probability on expected utilities. This means that before
migration the expected utility decreases more in region 1 with an increasing size of
the unions, so that migration is lower.
11Regional UI
Table 3 states the corresponding results for the endogenous variables in the case of
regional UI budgets. If the size of the union exceeds 20% of the labour force, no
inner solution can be found for the given functions and parameter values.
p 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
n1 0.582 0.590 0.598 0.605 0.612
m1 0.617 0.616 0.616 0.615 0.615
w1 0.697 0.683 0.670 0.658 0.646
1 0.034 0.025 0.017 0.009 0.002
n2 0.337 0.344 0.349 0.354 0.359
m2 0.383 0.384 0.384 0.385 0.385
w2 0.438 0.427 0.418 0.410 0.402
2 0.078 0.066 0.057 0.049 0.042
Table 3: numerical results, regional UI
Qualitatively, the results are the same as for the case of central UI. Equilibrium
wages negatively depend on the degree of centralisation of the wage bargain because
unions take into account that a higher wage rate has a negative in
uence on aggre-
gated employment, which in turn tends to raise the regional equilibrium UI tax rate.
The larger a union is, the more of this eect is internal from its point of view. Lower
equilibrium wages yield higher employment, which leads to lower UI taxes in both
regions. However, one important dierence with reference to the model with central
UI emerges: Migration is almost not aected by the size of the unions. This result
is due to the fact that wages in region 2 react much more elastically on variations
of p in the case of regional UI, so that there is less dierence between the processes
evolving in both regions.
Comparison of the models
Figure 1 shows the preferences of rms and workers concerning the organisation of
UI for dierent sizes of the unions relative to the total labour force. Positive values
signify that the expected utility or the prots are higher with a central UI, negative
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> > > > :
> 0 rms from region i prefer central UI






> > > > <
> > > > :
> 0 workers from region i prefer central UI
< 0 workers from region i prefer regional UI,
where the subscripts C and R stand for "model with central UI" and "model with
regional UI", respectively.
Apart from the preferences of the agents, an eciency criterion, z, is used to
assess the measure. For this aim the total production in both regions has to be
calculated, lowered by the total costs of migration. Related to one rm from each













The number of workers per rm is M=2K ex ante since workers are distributed
evenly across all rms (see assumption A4). To nd out under which arrangement
more income rests for consumption, the dierence between z in the case of central
UI and z in the case of regional UI is calculated:






















Again, positive values signify an advantage of central UI and negative ones that
regional UI is preferable. If, for instance, the value of z is positiv, it is potentially
possible that all workers and rms are better o with central UI if the excess of
production is distributed appropriately.
The results depicted in gure 1 underline the importance of the bargaining struc-
ture for an assessment of the question whether UI should be regional or not. With
small unions, rms from the poor region prefer UI on the central (federal) level,











Figure 1: Comparison of the central and the regional model
of the labour force. The eciency criterion also advocates federal UI if p is small
and regionally dierenciated UI if p is above a certain point (0:07). In contrast,
workers from both regions are always better o with federal UI, and rms from the
rich region make higher prots with regional UI.
The described results can be explained by the functional courses of the wages,
given in tables 2 and 3. Equilibrium wages are lower if unions are larger. The
reason is that unions take the negative eect of wages on aggregated employment
into account and consider thus that higher wages cause the UI tax rate(s) to rise.
This eect is stronger if UI is regional because there are only half as many unions
relevant for the budget constraint of UI. Therefore, it is not surprising that regional
UI is the more advantagous for rms, the higher the degree of centralisation of
the bargain is. The inverse accounts for workers. Ex ante, lower wages are to
the disadvantage of all workers because the expected utility is lowered. Ex post,
some workers can yet be better o because the probability of entering employment
rises. Preferences of workers from both regions must be parallel because of the
compensating eect of migration. A smaller wage rate leads to higher employment
and enhances thus total production, which causes the eciency criterion to favour
regional UI when p is relatively high. The fact that eciency is higher with central
UI when p is small, is due to the more intense migration in the case of regional UI.
14The additional migration costs lower consumption possibilities so that rms from
region 2 and workers from both regions could potentially compensate rms from
region 1 for the disadvantage they suer from federal UI.
4 Conclusions
Calmfors and Drill (1988) deal with the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining
in a completely dierent context. However, one parallel is that centralisation of the
bargain can be viewed as an internalisation of externalities which results in lower
wages. Among other things, the main dierence is that the source of wage dierences
in that paper has to do with the extent to which rms can shift higher wages to
output prices, i.e. it lies on the labour demand side. In contrast, the cause of the
eects here lies in the behavior of the unions, i.e. the labour supply side, while we
abstract from price eects.
This study examines the eects of the bargaining structure on the assessment
of centrally vs. regionally equilibrated UI budgets. For this aim, two models are
contrasted, one with either organisational form of UI. The models are characterised
by a relatively complex structure, stemming from the requirements to include a
rather elaborated bargaining setup, UI and migration decisions of workers. On the
one hand, an obvious objection to be made is thus that the results can only be
derived numerically. On the other hand, the ndings are traced back to plausible
interactions between the endogenous variables. Our main results are:
1. With the assumed functions and parameter values, workers from both regions
are always in favour of central UI and rms from the rich region are always
better o with regional UI. In contrast, rms from the poor region prefer
central UI with relatively decentral wage bargaining, and prefer regional UI
with relatively central wage bargaining. The eciency criterion favours central
UI in the former case and regional UI in the latter case.
2. The more workers a union represents in relation to the total number of workers,
the lower is the equilibrium wage rate for a given organisational form of UI.
153. The eect of the bargaining structure on the resulting wage rate is stronger in
the case of regional UI than in the case of central UI.
Result 1 contradicts the initial intuition that economic agents from the poor regions
prefer central UI, whereas agents from the rich region prefer regional UI in general,
and that regionalisation of UI generally enhances eciency. Even though other
specications of the model may alter the results to some extent, the mere possibility
of our results shows that sweeping and intuitive judgements are not appropriate
when dealing with this complex subject (see also Sanner, 2001).
The eects of the bargaining structure on prots and expected utilities of work-
ers can be traced back to dierences of wages. In the given context, the preferability
of higher wages is reduced because they come along with higher UI taxes. Hence,
a union is ready to agree on lower wages than a union which neglects this eect.
Consequently, the standard assumption of decentralised bargaining seems to be in-
adequate when dealing with self-nancing UI. This argument is even more important
when central and regional UI are being compared, because the in
uence of an agree-
ment on wages between a union and the corresponding rms on UI parameters is
stronger in the case of regional UI. Put dierently, regionalisation of UI acts as a
discipline on union wage demands if the bargain concerns a non-negligable portion
of the total workforce.
Footnote
1. The signs of the derivatives only follow if x > n, which is guaranteed by the
choice of the parameters made hereafter.
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